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For more than a hundred years,1 the Supreme Court of the
United States has been telling us that immigration law2 is just plain
different. In constitutional matters, the Court has translated those
* Charles F. Nagel Professor of International and Comparative Law, Washington
University. I thank Louis Henkin, Ronald Mann, and Margaret Taylor for their thoughtful
comments and Molly Blades for her valuable research assistance.
1. The case usually cited as the first in which the Court treated immigration as a
special subspecies is Chae Chan Ping v. United States [the Chinese Exclusion Case], 130
U.S. 581 (1889).
2. For present purposes, I am using the term "immigration law" to describe only that
body of law that governs the admission and expulsion of aliens. The more general law of
aliens' rights and obligations lends itself to fewer generalizations; even there, however, the
Supreme Court has invoked theories of special judicial deference when aliens have
challenged the constitutionality of federal action. See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67
(1976); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960); Stephen H. Legomsky, Suspending the
Social Security Benefits of Deported Aliens: The Insult and the Injury, 13 SUFFOLK U. L.
Rnv. 1235 (1979). For a good discussion of the pertinent distinctions, see Margaret H.
Taylor, Detained Aliens Challenging Conditions of Confinement and the Porous Border of
the Plenary Power Doctrine, 22 HAsTINGs CONsT. L.Q. 1087 (1995) [in this symposium].
See also infra note 43.
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differences into an official doctrine of special judicial deference to
Congress.
The precise degree of that special deference has varied with both
the context and the era. The Court has described the congressional
power to regulate immigration as "plenary."3 It has said, "Over no
conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more
complete."4 In the early years, this principle of plenary congressional
authority over immigration was often expressed in absolute terms; the
suggestion was that courts had literally no power to review the
constitutionality of Congress's actions.5 In later years the Court
began to hedge, leaving open the possibility of some judicial role in
assessing the constitutionality of federal immigration statutes. 6 In
addition, by way of exception, the Court has generally guaranteed one
particular constitutional right-procedural due process-in
deportation cases.7
In the mid-1980's, I wrote two companion pieces-an article and
a book chapter-on this plenary congressional power to regulate
immigration.8 The collective object of the two pieces was to study
3. See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766, 768, 769 (1972); Boutilier v.
INS, 387 U.S. 118, 123 (1967).
4. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909), quoted in
Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977), and in Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766
(1972).
5. See, e.g., Lees v. United States, 150 U.S. 476,480 (1893) (power to exclude aliens is
"absolute" and is "not open to challenge in the courts"); Fong Yue ing v. United States,
149 U.S. 698, 706 (1893) (Congress's decision is "conclusive upon the Judiciary"); Chae
Chan Ping v. United States [Chinese Exclusion Case], 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) (same).
6. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787,792 (congressional power is "largely immune"
from judicial review) (emphasis added), 793 n.5 (positing a judicial power, admittedly
"limited", to review even congressional decisions excluding aliens) (1977); Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952) (immigration legislation "largely immune from
judicial interference").
7. The leading case is Yamataya v. Fisher [the Japanese Immigrant Case], 189 U.S. 86,
100 (1903). Accord, Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950). I use the term
"generally" because the leading early case had seemed to hold due process inapplicable
even in deportation proceedings. See, e.g., Fong Yue ing v. United States, 149 U.S. 698
(1893).
More recently, the Court has extended this exception to those exclusion proceedings
in which the aliens are lawful permanent residents seeking to return from brief visits
abroad. See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32-37 (1982). Under those limited
circumstances, the individual interests at stake make exclusion the functional equivalent of
deportation.
8. Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary
Congressional Power, 1984 Sup. Cr. Rv. 255 [hereinafter cited as Legomsky I); STEPHEN
H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY - LAW AND POLITICS IN BRITAIN AND
AMERiCA, ch. 3 (entitled Immigration and the US Constitution) (1987) [hereinafter cited as
Legomsky II].
comprehensively the history, theory, soundness, politics, and likely
future course of the plenary power doctrine. Since their publication,
roughly ten years have passed and many crucial judicial decisions have
been rendered. The present article examines those events, assessing
which predictions have come true and which have not. In the process,
I offer a set of new, improved predictions that will probably require
similar humility and revision ten years hence.
Section I will summarize briefly the conclusions reached in the
two prior publications. Section II will synthesize the subsequent
judicial trends and reformulate the predictions in the light of those
patterns.
I. The Mid-1980's Analysis 9
In Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional
Power, my goal was to be comprehensive. I attempted to identify and
to evaluate every legal theory that might be gleaned from a century's
worth of Supreme Court jurisprudence in support of special judicial
restraint in immigration cases.
Several such theories, some interrelated, have emerged over the
years. The Court has suggested that the constitutionality of immigra-
tion legislation is inherently a political question 10 because immigration
is inseparable from foreign affairs;" that an alien is merely a "guest"
asserting a "privilege" rather than a "member" asserting a "right";' 2
that allowing aliens to assert constitutional rights in addition to any
remedies they enjoy under international law would give them an un-
9. In writing the two pieces discussed in this section, I drew liberally from several
thoughtful articles that had already examined certain specific aspects of the plenary power
doctrine. See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of
Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. Rnv. 1362, 1387-96 (1953); Siegfried
Hesse, The Constitutional Status of the Lawfully Admitted Permanent Resident Alien: The
Inherent Limits of the Power to Expel, 69 YALE L.J. 262 (1959); Siegfried Hesse, The
Constitutional Status of the Lawfully Admitted Permanent Resident Alien: The Pre-1917
Cases, 68 YALE LJ. 1578 (1959); James A.R. Nafziger, The General Admission of Aliens
Under International Law, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 804 (1983); Peter H. Schuck, The
Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 14-30 (1984).
10. In the immigration context the Court has typically used language functionally
equivalent to "political question." For examples, see Legomsky I, supra note 8, at 261 n.30;
see also Reno v. Flores, 113 S. Ct. 1439, 1449 (1993) (describing alien regulation as "com-
mitted to the political branches of the Federal Government") (emphasis added). The se-
mantics generate some difficult substantive questions that are thoughtfully examined in
Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J 597 (1976).
11. Legomsky I, supra note 8, at 261-69.
12. Id. at 269-70.
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fair advantage over United States citizens;13 that aliens' lack of alle-
giance to the United States should correlate to lessened constitutional
protection;14 that the congressional power to regulate immigration is
inherent in national sovereignty and therefore insulated from the
usual constitutional constraints; 5 and that the Constitution 16 is inap-
plicable in exclusion proceedings because in the eyes of the law an
excluded alien is outside the United States.' 7
In addition to those substantive rationales, the unrelenting stream
of plenary power decisions lent overpowering force to stare decisis. In
1954, the Court lamented that "the slate is not clean" and that the
principle of plenary congressional power over immigration had be-
come too deeply ingrained to be overruled.' 8 I argued that all of
those theories-both substantive and procedural-were unconvincing
reasons to preserve the plenary power doctrine. My stated aim, pre-
sumptuous I admit, was to "clean the slate."' 9
The same article explored some of the external influences on the
plenary power decisions. It concluded that the social backgrounds
and political attitudes of the Supreme Court Justices did not ade-
quately explain the development of the plenary power doctrine. At
the same time, the article suggested that the Justices' general concep-
tions of their appropriate roles, together with a combination of con-
temporary social and political forces, account in part for the evolution
of plenary congressional power over immigration.2 °
The article then demonstrated that the lower courts, increasingly
uneasy about sanctioning a virtually unreviewable congressional
power, had begun to forge creative detours around the plenary power
doctrine. Three such techniques were identified. One device was to
draw esoteric distinctions, including distinctions between distinctions.
A second was to carve out an exception for procedural due process in
13. Id. at 270-72.
14. Id. at 272-73.
15. Id. at 273-75.
16. In Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993), the Court similarly
limited the reach of a treaty provision and a corresponding statutory provision that prohib-
ited the forcible return of refugees to countries of persecution.
17. Legomsky I, supra note 8, at 275-77. A seventh theory, which I entitled the "po-
etic justice" theory, is more context-specific. It applies only to those aliens who are ex-
cluded or deported on the basis of their affiliation with the Communist Party. Id. at 277-
78.
18. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530-31 (1954), followed in Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S.
787, 792 n.4 (1977); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766-67 (1972).
19. Legomsky I, supra note 8, at 306.
20. Id. § II.
deportation cases.21 A third was to acknowledge the plenary power
doctrine but to read it as if the word "plenary" were meaningless. I
argued that all of these techniques, while well intentioned, were at
least unsatisfying and in most cases logically indefensible.'
Finally, the article attempted to forecast the future of the plenary
power doctrine. Analogizing to familiar legal traditions, the article
predicted, first, that the various devices by which the lower courts
have partially circumvented the doctrine would keep expanding. Sec-
ond, the article said, once the exceptions are on the verge of swallow-
ing the rule, the Supreme Court would candidly clean the slate. I
thought the Court would
describe the historical evolution of the rule, identify the excep-
tions, expose the analytical inadequacies of the exceptions, ob-
serve the inevitable direction of the tide, and conclude that the
time has come to lay the general principle to rest.3
The second piece, written at the same time but published three
years later as a book chapter, detailed the historical development of
the plenary power doctrine.24 It focused solely on the Supreme
Court's use of precedent in creating, developing, and solidifying, but
ultimately qualifying, this selective form of judicial restraint. My gen-
eral thesis in that chapter was that the doctrine had unfolded inadver-
tently, through misplaced reliance on holdings far more modest than
the existence of unreviewable congressional power. More specifically,
I argued that the Court had unwittingly relied on federalism cases to
reach conclusions about individual constitutional rights.'
In the past ten years, an army of commentators has sustained the
shelling. Several have elaborated thoughtfully on specific aspects of
the plenary power doctrine. Some have argued for First Amendment
exceptions or qualifications. 26 Some have emphasized the interna-
tional law constraints.2 7 One writer has examined in detail the extent
21. A fine article by Professor Motomura later elaborated on the procedural due pro-
cess exception. Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Proce-
dural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1625 (1992).
22. Legomsky I, supra note 8, § III.
23. Id. at 305.
24. Legomsky II, supra note 8.
25. Id. In the present article I spare the reader the tedious case-by-case details of that
argument. For anyone who would like to experience that sort of tedium and monotony,
however, I highly recommend the original source.
26. See e.g., John A. Scanlan, Aliens in the Marketplace of Ideas: The Government, the
Academy, and the McCarran-Walter Act, 66 Tx. L. REv. 1481 (1988); Comment, Ideologi-
cal Exclusion, Plenary Power, and the PLO, 77 CAL. L. REV. 831 (1989).
27. Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chi-
nese Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 HARv. L. REv. 853, 863-85 (1987); Michael A. Scaper-
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to which the United States Constitution applies outside United States
territory.28 Another has offered a well constructed elaboration of the
"alien as guest, citizen as member" theory.29 Another suggestion has
been that the Court has used the plenary power doctrine to deter, and
to dispose of, judicial challenges. 3° Finally, it has been argued that the
existence of the plenary power doctrine makes it difficult to defend
certain statutory interpretations ostensibly predicated on a desire to
avoid constitutional barriers.31
H. Old Predictions and New Reality Checks
A. The Lower Courts
At the lower court level, the life of the plenary power doctrine
has been one of fits and starts. On the one hand, many lower courts
continue to apply the doctrine in its more rigid form, typically in the
context of exclusion proceedings. Emphasizing the extraterritorial po-
sitions of excluded aliens, these courts have followed the script of
United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy:32 "Whatever the proce-
dure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien
denied entry is concerned. '33 On that theory, these courts have held
that excluded aliens detained on Guantanamo or elsewhere have no
due process or equal protection rights to challenge either their exclu-
sion or their prolonged detention.34
On the other hand, as predicted, many other lower courts have
reinforced and expanded the devices for circumventing at least the
traditional version of the plenary power doctrine. Several judges have
become overtly inventive. The discussion that follows will identify
some of these trends.
landa, Polishing the Tarnished Golden Door, 1993 Wis. L. Rnv. 965 (emergence of modern
human rights law, which explicitly recognizes individual rights rooted in international law,
renders classical international law's emphasis on sovereignty obsolete).
28. Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909 (1991).
29. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the Constitution, 7
CoNsr. COMMENTARY 9 (1990) (special deference in immigration stems from belief that
aliens are not full members of society; at least lawful permanent resident aliens should be
treated as full members for purposes of constitutional review).
30. Kevin R. Johnson, Responding to the Litigation Explosion: The Plain Meaning of
Executive Branch Primacy over Immigration, 71 N.C. L. REv. 413 (1993).
31. Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law after a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990).
32. 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
33. Id. at 544.
34. See, e.g., Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441 (9th Cir. 1995); Cuban Ameri-
can Bar Association v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412 (11th Cir. 1995); Amanullah v. Nelson,
811 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1987); Garcia-Mir v. Smith, 766 F.2d 1478 (11th Cir. 1985).
1. Liberalizing the Rhetoric
Even by the mid-1980's, when aliens invoked either equal protec-
tion or substantive due process, courts in deportation cases would oc-
casionally soften the plenary power doctrine by interpreting it as a
mild rational basis test. 5 In the past ten years, that occasional liberal-
ization has grown into a virtually settled practice. It is now routine for
lower courts to state the test in rational basis terms, with varying de-
grees of actual bite.36 The Supreme Court in Reno v. Flores recently
followed suit.3 7 Some courts have even extended the rational basis
test to exclusion proceedings.38
2. Expanding the Procedural Due Process Exception
One clear exception to the principle of plenary congressional
power had emerged early on: the applicability of procedural due pro-
cess in deportation cases. 39 Noticeable in the past ten years, however,
are at least two devices by which lower courts have expanded that
exception.
One such device has enabled the courts to extend the exception
to certain categories of exclusion cases. The Supreme Court has held
that excluded aliens may not challenge the constitutionality of Con-
gress's decision to exclude or even to detain.40 But lower courts have
recently relaxed that constraint by allowing excluded aliens to chal-
lenge the conditions of their confinement on due process grounds.
The Fifth Circuit has held that even excluded aliens have due process
rights to be free of "gross physical abuse" by state and federal officials
35. For a list of examples, see Legomsky I, supra note 8, at 296 n.215.
36. See, e.g., Raya-Ledesma v. INS, 42 F.3d 1263, 1265 (9th Cir. 1994); Azizi v. Thorn-
burgh, 908 F.2d 1130, 1133 n.2 (2d Cir. 1990); Tran v. Caplinger, 847 F. Supp. 469, 478-79
(W.D. La. 1993); Gomez-Arauz v. McNary, 746 F. Supp. 1071, 1075 (W.D. Ok. 1990).
37. 113 S. Ct. 1439, 1449 (1993) (holding that INS regulation must "rationally ad-
vanc[e] some legitimate governmental purpose" but concluding ultimately that the chal-
lenged regulation met that test). See generally Comment, Constitutional Law -
Immigration - Due Process Does Not Compel Pre-Hearing Release of Alien Juveniles to
Adults Other than Parents or Legal Guardians, Reno v. Flores, 113 S. Ct 1439 (1993), 18
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 359 (1995).
38. See e.g., Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363, 1373 (5th Cir. 1987). Cf Azizi v.
Thornburgh, 908 F.2d 1130, 1133 n.2 (2d Cir. 1990) (translating "facially legitimate and
bona fide reason" test, articulated in the exclusion context by Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408
U.S. 753, 770 (1972), into a standard rational basis test).
39. See Legomsky I, supra note 8, at 298.
40. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953). The Court
reached that result even with respect to a returning resident, but that feature of the deci-
sion might no longer be good law. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982).
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as long as the aliens are physically on United States soil.41 The Ninth
Circuit reached a similar result by declaring that either irrational or
excessive detention can amount to punishment even without an intent
to punish, and that such punishment cannot be imposed without due
process.42
Welcome as such decisions are, they are hard to square with the
long line of Supreme Court decisions holding due process inapplicable
to excluded aliens.43 The issues raised in these modem cases seem
relevant only to the content of due process. Yet content becomes ir-
relevant if, as the Supreme Court has said, an excluded alien may not
challenge the procedures authorized by Congress at all.
A second expansion of the procedural due process exception has
occurred through broad characterizations of the word "procedural."
In at least two lines of cases-one involving marriage fraud44 and the
other involving mandatory detention of certain criminal aliens45 _
some lower courts have managed to strike down congressional action
that would probably have survived "substantive" constitutional at-
tacks. In each of these lines of cases, courts that have characterized
the constitutional challenges as procedural have done so by employing
irrebuttable presumption reasoning. They have suggested, in effect,
that the pertinent statutory distinctions reflected empirical assump-
tions that the aliens should have the opportunity to refute. Applying
Mathews v. Eldridge," these courts then invoked the same procedural
due process standards that apply in other areas of administrative
law.47
41. See Medina v. O'Neill, 838 F.2d 800, 803 (5th Cir. 1988) (but finding no gross
physical abuse on the facts), rev'g Medina v. O'Neill, 589 F. Supp. 1028, 1032-33 (S.D. Tex.
1984) (holding due process constraints applicable to excluded aliens and ultimately finding
gross physical abuse); Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363, 1374 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding due
process violated). For a thorough discussion of this line of cases, see Taylor, supra note 2,
at 1143-51.
42. Alvarez-Mendez v. Stock, 941 F.2d 956, 962 (9th Cir. 1991).
43. In addition to Mezei, see, e.g., United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338
U.S. 537 (1950); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892). Margaret Taylor
argues that the "gross physical abuse" cases are not true "immigration" cases and thus not
subject to the plenary power doctrine at all. Taylor, supra note 2. As she acknowledges,
however, id. at 1153-56, federal statutes that regulate aliens but not immigration have simi-
larly received judicial deference.
44. STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY 94-95, 165-68 (1992);
Motomura, supra note 21, at 1659-65.
45. Legomsky, supra note 43, at 95-96; Motomura, supra note 21, at 1669-73.
46. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
47. I do not mean to imply that findings of due process violations have been the norm
even in these cases. As the cited pages illustrate, the decisions have gone both ways.
3. Carving out New Exceptions or Near-Exceptions
Just as the courts have developed a procedural due process ex-
ception to the plenary power doctrine, so too there are signs-admit-
tedly mixedn$-of an emerging First Amendment exception. In
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee v. Meese (ADC),4 9 a
district court held that the usual First Amendment standards apply in
deportation cases. The district court based its conclusion on Harisia-
des v. Shaughnessy,0 where the Supreme Court had rejected the First
Amendment challenges of several deported aliens. In Harisiades the
Court had summarily cited Dennis v. United States5 1 which at the time
had defined the First Amendment limitations on the government's au-
thority to curtail political speech. Because the Court in Harisiades
had cited Dennis and had not mentioned the plenary power doctrine,
the district court in ADC read Harisiades as an application of tradi-
tional First Amendment standards to deportation cases.
In Rafeedie v. INS, 2 another district court went a step further,
applying customary First Amendment standards to aliens challenging
their exclusion from the United States. The court held that aliens en-
joy as much First Amendment protection as citizens do, and it saw no
difficulty in applying that philosophy to exclusion cases.
Elsewhere I have questioned the assumption that the Supreme
Court in Harisiades meant to apply the usual First Amendment stan-
dards in deportation cases.5 3 My skepticism is, of course, even
stronger with respect to exclusion. The Dennis case that the Court in
Harisiades suggested it was applying had held that restrictions on
political speech would be valid only when there was a "clear and pres-
ent danger" of a sufficiently important evil.54 Yet in Harisiades the
Court neither stated nor applied the Dennis test. At no point did the
Court in Harisiades consider whether the advocacy or associations
that rendered the aliens deportable posed the required clear and pres-
ent danger. Under those circumstances, while again I applaud the re-
sult, the district court's assumption about Harisiades might well have
been wishful thinking.
48. See Price v. INS, 962 F.2d 836 (9th Cir. 1992) (according special judicial deference
in naturalization cases).
49. 714 F. Supp. 1060 (C.D. Cal. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 940 F.2d 445 (9th Cir.
1991).
50. 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
51. 341 U.S. 494 (1951), cited in Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 592 nn.18-19.
52. 795 F. Supp. 13 (D.D.C. 1992).
53. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY, supra note 44, at 87.
54. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 515 (1951).
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As the cases discussed in this subsection demonstrate, the predic-
tion that the courts would become increasingly inventive in their
quests to avoid the principle of plenary congressional power has been
borne out. Unfortunately, as the next subsection will show, my pro-
phetic powers seem to end there.
B. The Supreme Court
As noted earlier, I also predicted that lower courts' expansion of
the exceptions to the plenary power doctrine would eventually lead
the Supreme Court to clean the slate in one fell swoop. I expected the
dam to burst with a sudden, dramatic announcement that, henceforth,
immigration cases would be treated just like any other cases. Whether
involving exclusion or deportation,55 the immigration-related subject
matter would no longer affect either the formulation or the applica-
tion of the pertinent constitutional standard.
Obviously, that has not happened. Since the making of those pre-
dictions, the Supreme Court has decided no cases in which the consti-
tutionality of congressional56 action in the field of immigration has
been at issue. Perhaps the bursting of the dam is still on the horizon,
waiting for the exceptions to grow fatter. But I now think the disman-
tling of the plenary power doctrine is unlikely to follow that script.
For one thing, the composition of the Supreme Court has changed
substantially; its members are more conservative, both politically and
judicially. For another, a different scenario seems to be in progress
already.
Under this revised scenario, the lower courts and the Supreme
Court allow the plenary power doctrine to wear away by attrition.
Little by little, exceptions and qualifications will reduce the doctrine
to a shadow of its former self without an express overruling of con-
trary precedent. At the lower court level, this pattern is already evi-
dent in the cases that apply the rational basis test to substantive due
process and equal protection challenges in the deportation setting; in
the cases that apply the traditional Mathews v. Eldridge factors to pro-
cedural due process challenges; and in the cases that apply the then
55. My previous writings on the plenary power doctrine did not address those cases
that involved aliens' rights outside the contexts of exclusion and deportation. Decisions
like Diaz and Nestor, which involved federal restrictions on aliens' eligibility for welfare
and social security, respectively, spoke in traditional rational basis terms but in the end
accorded exceptional deference to Congress. See supra note 2. I would have expected the
overruling of the plenary power doctrine to influence those cases as well.
56. The closest the Court has come to such a case is Reno v. Flores, 113 S. Ct. 1439
(1993), where the Court upheld the constitutionality of an INS regulation.
prevailing First Amendment standards to restrictions on political
speech and associations. 7 Some sleight of hand might be necessary,
but perhaps the Supreme Court will say something like this:
As we have consistently observed, Congress has the plenary
power to decide which classes of aliens will be excluded and
which ones will be deported. The breadth of that power is con-
siderable, and the courts may not disturb Congress's decision
simply because they would have preferred a different resolution.
But that is not to say the congressional power is unlimited.
As when it legislates in any other area, Congress is constrained
by the Constitution. And ever since Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137 (1803), we have recognized that, with some ex-
ceptions, the interpretation of those constitutional constraints is
a judicial responsibility.
We have never held otherwise. To be sure, some of our
early opinions in this area contain broad language designed to
emphasize the importance of appropriate judicial deference.
But whenever we have found congressional decisions "conclu-
sive upon the judiciary" or have otherwise suggested the ab-
sence of judicial power, the assumption was always that the
particular congressional action was within the applicable consti-
tutional constraints. The reason we could not intervene in those
cases was simply that Congress had done nothing unconstitu-
tional. That explanation especially fits our seminal decision in
Chae Chan Ping v. United States [Chinese Exclusion Case], 130
U.S. 581 (1889), as Professor Legomsky has convincingly
demonstrated. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration and the
Judiciary - Law and Politics in Britain and America 192-94
(1987). 5
Our decision in Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977), is illus-
trative. While upholding the particular statutory provision in
question, we expressly acknowledged "a limited judicial respon-
sibility under the Constitution even with respect to the power of
Congress to regulate the admission and exclusion of aliens." Id.
at 793 n.5. We proceeded to examine the substantive rationality
of the challenged statutory distinction. At least one lower court
has correctly read Fiallo as embodying the functional equivalent
of the rational basis test - the same test that more generally
governs substantive due process and equal protection chal-
lenges. Azizi v. Thornburgh, 908 F.2d 1130, 1133 n.2 (2d Cir.
1990).
Our other immigration decisions follow the same pattern.
In Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952), we looked to
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), a non-immigration
57. See supra § ll.A.
58. This last sentence is wishful thinking, but I have never been cited in a real
Supreme Court opinion and will settle for being cited in a fictional one.
Summer 19951 TEN MORE YEARS OF PLENARY POWER
936 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 22:925
case, for the applicable First Amendment standard. In another
deportation case, Kaoru Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903),
we approved and applied traditional notions of procedural due
process.
Thus, what some commentators have called the plenary
power doctrine is in truth not a special "doctrine" at all. It is
simply a convenient shorthand label for the common sense
proposition that in immigration, as in most other areas of fed-
eral law, Congress has broad leeway to make sensitive policy
decisions. Courts are ill equipped to second-guess those judg-
ments. We will review federal immigration statutes for compli-
ance with the Constitution, but, as in any other field, our role
ends there.
If that form of denial strategy comes across as unlikely, there is a
more plausible modified version. The Court could deny that special
judicial deference is due in deportation cases (and possibly in other
alien regulation cases when the aliens are formally within the United
States) but adhere to either the existing plenary power doctrine or a
scaled-down version of it in exclusion cases. If so inclined, the Court
has many ways in which to distinguish deportation from exclusion. 9
Moreover, whatever difficulty the Court might face in trying to sug-
gest that there has never been a plenary power doctrine for deporta-
tion cases, the barriers to credible denial would be even higher in
exclusion cases, where both the rhetoric and the results of earlier
opinions were often quite absolute.
Even with respect to exclusion, however, the modified approach
would leave room for the Court to soften the plenary power doctrine.
It could cite the Fiallo footnote and go from there. It could interpret
Kleindienst v. Mandel, in which it applied a "facially legitimate and
bona fide reason" test to the First Amendment rights of United States
citizens to receive the ideas of excluded aliens,60 as an all-purpose ra-
tional basis test for the constitutionality of speech-related exclusion
grounds. Perhaps that kind of restricted plenary power doctrine-a
new "PPD-lite"-is in the offing.
Thus, I still predict continued weakening of the special judicial
deference to Congress in immigration (and other federal alien regula-
tion) cases. But I now believe that the transformation will proceed
59. For a summary, see LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PoLICY, supra note 44, at
44-47. The most compelling distinctions are those that rest on the presumed extraterrito-
rial nature of exclusion proceedings or on assumptions about the differing magnitudes of
the individual interests at stake, although even those distinctions are not free from doubt.
Id.
60. 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972).
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only by steady erosion, rather than by a sequence of erosion followed
by express overruling. Moreover, I no longer believe that in the fore-
seeable future the end result will be the complete abolition of this
special deference. An emasculated version of the plenary power doc-
trine now seems more likely. Possible attributes of PPD-lite include
(a) specific exceptions to the principle of special judicial deference;
(b) justiciability of other constitutional challenges to immigration leg-
islation but under narrower-than-usual standards of review; and (c)
occasional references to the "plenary" nature of Congress's power or
to the "special" deference owed in immigration cases, as makeweights
to support independently reached decisions upholding congressional
action.
11. Conclusion
Immigration commentators are well aware that our field has long
been a constitutional oddity. For the most part, the Supreme Court
has not applied to immigration cases the constitutional norms familiar
in other areas of public law. That special judicial deference, known inimmigration circles as the plenary power doctrine, has never been ad-
equately explained on grounds of either policy or precedent. It is not
enough to lament that "the slate is not clean."
In the mid-1980's, I argued that it was time to clean the slate and
predicted with some confidence that the Court would do so. To be
sure, there have been continued inroads. At this juncture, however, I
must concede with regret that the slate is still dirty.
But the dirt has become no more encrusted, and the lower courts
in fact have continued to chisel away at some of the more unsightly
deposits. I believe that the Supreme Court will soon start to help out
with the chiseling. Unlikely as the Court is to abolish the plenary
power doctrine outright, it can, and probably will, give us PPD-lite.
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